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Foreword 
 
 
 
The International Symposium on Stabilisation of Greenhouse Gas Concentrations – 
Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change - took place, at the invitation of the British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair and under the sponsorship of the UK Department for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), at the Met Office, Exeter, United Kingdom, on 1-3 February 
2005.  
 
The conference discussed the long-term implications of different levels of climate change 
for different sectors and for the world as a whole. Major themes included key vulnerabilities 
of the climate system and critical thresholds, socio-economic effects, both globally and  
regionally, emission pathways to climate stabilisation and technological options available to 
achieve stabilisation levels.  
 
The conference brought together over 200 participants from some 30 countries, mainly 
including scientists, and representatives from international organisations and national 
governments. The conference offered a unique opportunity for scientists to exchange views 
on the consequences and risks presented to the natural and human systems as a result of 
changes in the world's climate, and on the pathways and technologies to limit GHG 
emissions and atmospheric concentrations. 
 
This report, prepared by the International Scientific Steering Committee (ISSC), 
summarises findings as presented at the conference. I am very grateful to the ISSC for 
their many  suggestions and contributions. 
 
The Chair 
 
Dennis Tirpak 
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Summary 
 
The Third Assessment Report (2001) of the IPCC (TAR) reviewed in depth all the scientific, 
technical and socio-economic aspects of climate change. It concluded that there was 
strong evidence that climate change due to human emissions of greenhouse gases was 
already occurring and that future emissions of greenhouse gases were likely to  raise 
global temperatures by between 1.4 and 5.8 C during this century, with a wide range of 
impacts on the natural world and human society.  
 
Building on the TAR, the conference on Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change,  considered 
three scientific questions relating to stabilising greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at levels which would avoid dangerous anthropogenic climate change. These 
questions were: 
 
1. For different levels of climate change what are the key impacts, for different regions and 
sectors and for the world as a whole?  
 
2.  What would such levels of climate change imply in terms of greenhouse gas 
stabilisation concentrations and emission pathways required to achieve such levels? 
 
3. What options are there for achieving stabilisation of greenhouse gases at different 
stabilisation concentrations in the atmosphere, taking into account costs and uncertainties? 
 
The findings presented at the conference addressed different aspects of these questions. 
 
Assessment of Impacts 
 
Compared with the TAR there is greater clarity and reduced uncertainty about  the impacts 
of climate change across a wide range of systems, sectors and societies. In many cases 
the risks are more serious than previously thought. As noted in the TAR, a global 
temperature increase of  up to 1 C may be beneficial for a few regions and sectors such as 
high latitude areas and agriculture . A number of new impacts were identified that are 
potentially disturbing. One example is the recent change that is occurring in the acidity of 
the ocean. This is likely to reduce the capacity to absorb CO2 from the atmosphere and 
affect the entire marine food chain.  
 
A number of critical temperature levels and rates of change relative to pre-industrial times 
were noted. These vary for the globe, specific regions and sensitive ecosystems. For 
example, a regional increase above present levels of 2.7 C1 may be a threshold that 
triggers melting of the Greenland ice-cap, while an increase in global temperatures of 
about 1 C is likely to lead to extensive coral bleaching.  In general, surveys of the literature 
suggest increasing damage if the globe warms about 1 to 3 C above current levels. Serious 
risk of large scale, irreversible system disruption, such as reversal of the land carbon sink 
and possible destabilisation of the Antarctic ice sheets is more likely above 3 C. Such 
                                                 
1 This would be associated with a global temperature rise of about 1.5 C above present or about 2 C above 
pre-industrial temperature 
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levels are well within the range of climate change projections for the century. While a clear 
temperature threshold has not been identified for shutdown of the Atlantic thermohaline 
circulation, studies were presented suggesting that a shutdown becomes more likely with 
increasing temperature. In this context, some felt that it would be useful to agree upon a 
set of critical thresholds that we should aim not to cross. Others noted it would be difficult 
to objectively choose such a level. 
 
The impacts of climate change are already being observed in a variety of sectors 
Ecosystems are already showing the effects of climate change. Changes to polar ice and 
glaciers and rainfall regimes have already occurred. While consistent with model 
projections the links to anthropogenic climate change need to be investigated further.   
 
Many climate impacts, particularly the most damaging ones, will be associated with an 
increased frequency or intensity of extreme events. This is an important area for further 
work since many  studies do not explicitly take into account the effects of extremes, 
although it is known that such extremes pose significant risks to human well being. The 
heat-wave that affected Europe in 2003 is a prime example.  
 
Adaptive capacity is highly important to lessening the potential future dangerous effects of 
climate change. In some sectors and systems this capacity may be sufficient to delay or 
avoid much potential damage, though in others it is quite limited. 
 
The capacity to adapt is closely related to technological ability, income levels and form of 
governance in a country. Adaptation and alternative development pathways need to be 
taken into account in developing strategies to avoid dangerous anthropogenic climate 
change. This was seen as particularly important if the potential impacts of climate change 
in Africa are to be avoided.  
 
 
Climate sensitivity and emission pathways 
 
It is possible to decouple the assessment of different levels of stabilisation from 
consideration of the question of what is dangerous. The conference thus explored 
separately the emission pathways associated with different greenhouse gas stabilisation 
levels and different global temperature limits. It is helpful to take into account uncertainty in 
the sensitivity of the climate system to greenhouse forcing by presenting pathways in 
probabilistic terms. There is evidence that the sensitivity is now likely to be higher than 
quoted in the TAR, however observational data may constrain the range.    
 
There is a range of emission pathways that could be followed theoretically to avoid different 
temperature levels. Probability analysis provides a quantitative estimate of the risk that a 
particular temperature level would not be exceeded. For example, limiting warming to 2 C 
above pre-industrial levels with a relatively high certainty requires the equivalent 
concentration of CO2 to stay below 400 ppm. Conversely, if concentrations were to rise to 
550 ppm CO2 equivalent, then it is unlikely that the global mean temperature increase 
would stay below 2 C. Limiting climate change to 2  C above pre-industrial implies limiting 
the atmospheric concentration of all greenhouse gases. Based on new insights into the 
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uncertainty ranges of climate sensitivity, a stabilisation at 450 ppmv CO2 equivalent would 
imply a medium likelihood (~50%) of staying below 2 C warming.  In many cases this would 
mean that concentrations would peak before stabilising, though whether this could be 
achieved practically was not considered.  
 
Different models suggest that delaying action would require greater action later for the 
same temperature target and that even a delay of 5 years could be significant. If action to 
reduce emissions is delayed by 20 years, rates of emission reduction may need to be 3 to 
7 times greater to meet the same temperature target.  Coupled carbon-cycle GCM 
simulations showed the importance of considering the future of natural sources and sinks 
of carbon when determining how to achieve given CO2 stabilisation levels.  
 
 
Technological options 
 
The IEA World Energy Outlook 2004 predicts that CO2 emissions will increase by 63% over 
2002 levels by 2030. This is generally consistent with the IPCC emission scenarios, 
published in 2000. This means that the world will, in the absence of urgent and strenuous 
mitigation actions in the next 20 years, almost certainly be committed to a temperature rise 
of between about 0.5 C and 2 C relative to today by 2050.  
   
Technological options for  significantly reducing emissions over the long term already exist. 
Large reductions can be attained, using a portfolio of options whose costs are likely to be 
smaller than previously considered. Sustainable development strategies can  make low-
level stabilisation easier.  There are no magic bullets; a portfolio of options is needed and 
excluding any options will increase costs. Multi-gas strategies, emission trading, optimal 
timing and strong technology development, diffusion and trading are all required to keep 
costs of low-level stabilisation relatively low. Inclusion of technological learning in models 
suggests that projected costs of such reductions can be reduced by over half. To make 
required action more specific and transparent, the challenges could be broken down into 
discrete wedges, covering for example energy efficiency, nuclear energy, low-emission 
transport fuels and fossil fuel power plants with CO2 capture and storage.   
 
Globalizsation and market forces will drive the developing countries to follow the same 
pattern practiced by the developed countries. Demonstrated energy efficiency 
improvements under the present market system in industrialised countries are not enough 
to offset increases in demand caused by economic growth in developing countries, 
although some developing countries have shown much higher improvement rates over 
certain periods. Efficiency improvements and alternative energy supply such as nuclear 
and renewables are of priority for developing countries to contribute their share to the effort 
of stabilisation.  
 
Major investment is needed now in both mitigation and adaptation. The first is essential to 
minimise future impacts and the latter is essential to cope with impacts which cannot be 
avoided in the near to medium term. 
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Report of the conference by the Steering Committee 
Introduction 
 
The International Conference on Stabilisation of Greenhouse Gases – Avoiding Dangerous 
Climate Change took place, at the invitation of the British Prime Minister Tony Blair and 
under the sponsorship of the UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
(Defra), at the Met Office, Exeter, United Kingdom, on 1-3 February 2004.  
 
The conference brought together over 200 participants from some 30 countries, mainly 
scientists and representatives from international universities, organisations, and national 
governments. The conference offered a unique opportunity for scientists to exchange views 
on the consequences and risks presented to natural and human systems as a result of 
changes in the world's climate. 
 
The conference discussed the long-term implications of different levels of climate change 
for different sectors and for the world as a whole. Major themes included key vulnerabilities 
of the climate system and critical thresholds, socio-economic effects, both globally and 
regionally, emission pathways to stabilise greenhouse gases and technological options to 
achieve stabilisation level.  
 
This report by the Steering Committee is designed to give an overview of the key issues 
arising, but should not be seen as an exhaustive report. Readers are encourage to look at 
the papers and presentations which have been placed on the conference website at 
www.stabilisation2005.com  
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Keynote speech 
Dr Pachauri, chairman of the IPCC noted that “dangerous” climate change requires a value 
judgment but that these should be based on the principles of universal human rights and 
the needs of future generations, as exemplified in Sustainable Development. However, 
science can provide essential information on impacts and damage, taking into account 
socio-economic dimensions. 
 
He considered the issues relevant to the use of thresholds in defining dangerous climate 
change such as initial conditions, marginal impacts and damage, costs of impacts, 
irreversibility and adaptation. He noted that it would be important to consider who would be 
affected and the time scale for dangerous effects to become apparent. He also asked 
whether a temperature target would capture various dimensions of dangerous, whether a 
global target would represent dangers at the local level, how concentrations are related to 
temperature and what trajectories were appropriate. 
 
He noted current changes related to warming, and the scale of impacts which are 
anticipated, including the impact of extremes. He also noted the potential for major 
changes to the climate system, which could overwhelm our response strategies, including 
breakdown of the thermohaline circulation, disintegration of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet, a 
shift in mean climate towards an El Nino like state, reduced carbon sink capacity, methane 
release from hydrates, and a rearrangement of biome distributions.   
 
Finally he noted the inertia in the climate system and time taken for mitigation actions to 
impact on temperatures and sea levels, and the importance of mitigation in furthering 
sustainable development goals and maximising co- benefits of mitigation and implementing 
no regrets options. 
 
Session 1a -  Key vulnerabilities of the climate system and critical 
thresholds 
 
As a result of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, key components of the climate 
system are put under stress and may respond in an abrupt and irreversible way. Schneider 
emphasised this high impact general risk in his conceptual overview of “dangerous” climate 
change issues. He also portrayed the respective roles of scientists and policymakers in this 
complex arena. In particular, he introduced the notion of Type I errors (exaggerated 
precautionary action based on ultimately unfounded concerns) and Type II errors 
(insufficient hedging action delaying measures while waiting for the advent of 
overwhelming evidence). Schneider suggested ways out of this dilemma using recently 
developed probabilistic analyses (constructing, for instance, a cumulative density function 
for the IPCC TAR’s burning embers diagram). His observations were underpinned by a 
series of more-specific presentations addressing possible critical thresholds and tipping 
points in physical and biological systems.  
 
Rapley focussed on the Antarctic ice sheet and its relationship with sea-level. He 
presented new data-based results that cast further doubts on the stability of the West 
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Antarctic ice sheet. The melting of the ice shelves, such as Larsen B which has been 
continuously present since the last ice-age, may be leading to a speed up of some glaciers, 
by a factor of 2–6, in a “cork out of bottle” effect. These processes need to be incorporated 
in advanced ice-sheet models. The extents to which anthropogenic warming or natural 
variability are contributing to these changes is unknown. 
 
Lowe addressed the Greenland ice sheet which, if it melted would raise the global average 
sea-level by around 7 metres. Lowe reported on a model ensemble experiment based on 
the IPCC finding that local warming of more than 2.7 C would start the ice sheet to 
contract. Using a range of models and of emissions scenarios leading to CO2 stabilisation 
between 450 ppm and 1000 ppm, the study demonstrates that the trigger point could be 
reached within the next few decades. In fact, even with stabilisation at 450 ppm, 5% of the 
models and scenarios lead to a complete and irreversible meltdown, although this would 
take place over millennia.  
 
A package of three papers was dedicated to the stability of the North-Atlantic Thermohaline 
Circulation (THC). Schlesinger presented a novel assessment based on probability 
distributions for crucial system parameters and a spectrum of possible policy interventions. 
He estimated using a simplified model that business as usual emissions generates a 2 in 3 
chance of a THC collapse in the next 200 years. Challenor presented results, based on a 
massive ensemble study, using a medium-complexity model and Bayesian techniques. The 
study suggests a 30% possibility of THC shutdown by the end of this century. The 
ensemble has not been weighted by comparison with observations, although the parameter 
values were obtained from a previous model fit. Wood showed from a model simulation 
that the cooling effect of a hypothetical THC shutdown in 2050 would more than outweigh 
global warming in and around the N Atlantic. He demonstrated the feasibility of ensembles 
of GCMs to quantify the likelihood of THC collapse, noting that no GCM in IPCC TAR or 
since showed a shutdown by 2100. He noted that further modelling experiments and 
observation data are essential for more robust answers. 
 
Turley presented new data showing the marked acidification of the oceans due to 
atmospheric carbon dioxide enrichment. This acidification  may result in drastic changes in 
marine ecosystem structure and biogeochemical cycling with major impacts on the ocean 
carbon fluxes and the ability of the oceans to buffer further emissions of CO2 . 
 
The papers presented in this session illustrate why the term “global warming” is inadequate 
to describe the changes we can expect in the Earth System. We should not focus on 
temperature alone but on the anticipated shifts in climate variability, for example, with an 
increase in the frequency and severity of extreme events. As suggested, we have to 
consider systems risks such as the release of carbon from oceans, forests and permafrost, 
or the possibility of a rapid decline of Arctic sea ice. Addressing climate change will involve 
balancing uncertainties and understanding the dangers associated with delayed action.  
 
Our understanding of the Earth System is still incomplete and the models need to be 
improved. For example, while we have a good sense of how much the sea level would rise 
if the Greenland ice sheet were to disappear, we do not fully understand the time frame in 
which this might happen. Similarly, while we believe the THC behaviour can be 
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represented as a hysteresis curve we do not know its precise shape or where we are 
presently on it. Although this limits the ability to identify critical levels, nevertheless, our 
present knowledge, from palaeoclimatic data and from models, suggest a somewhat 
greater risk than expressed in the IPCC 3rd Assessment Report and is certainly sufficient to 
indicate the possibility of “tipping points” that we should strive to avoid.  
 
Session 1b - Impacts Overview 
 
Papers presented by Parry, Izrael, and Smith, and discussion led by Houghton, illustrated 
from different perspectives the extent to which tools are now emerging to support decision 
making in relation to the impacts of climate change. 
 
Parry stressed that key impacts and thresholds are affected by choice of scale, sector and 
adaptive capacity. Indications from the “Fast-Track” project are that stabilisation at 750 
ppm does not avoid most “dangerous” effects, whilst stabilisation at 550 ppm avoids some 
but not all dangerous climate change. Choice of development pathway (for example, IPCC 
SRES B2) can be as important as specific mitigation strategy.  
  
Izrael proposed tentative limits of a temperature rise of 2.5 C for the globe and 4 C for the 
Arctic, 1 m sea-level rise, with CO2 limited to 550-700 ppmv.  Global mitigation costs 
should not exceed 1-2% of the increase in GDP. 
  
Smith suggested there are many levels of potentially dangerous anthropogenic 
interference, given the complexity of climate change impacts and scales at which it is felt. It 
may be desirable to establish a goal which stabilises concentrations at as low a level as 
feasible, which can be revisited in the light of improvements in scientific understanding, the 
capacity to reduce emissions or as values change.  This should recognise that impacts 
below the goal may still be dangerous and will need to be the focus of adaptation. To be 
broadly accepted and meaningful, any process to determine a target should be 
transparent, and incorporate public values and perceptions. 
 
Papers during this session demonstrated the need to take into account both incremental 
and non linear impact processes, and the interactions between them, as well as the way in 
which climate and other human induced stresses operate in combination. The 
consequences of climate change vary with scale, from global to community level, and 
between regions. How to respond is a function not only of scientific understanding but also 
of values, which themselves vary between different communities, and over time as 
knowledge advances. Moreover as climate changes, societies will also be changing. New 
technologies are likely to emerge, new discoveries will be made and population shifts will 
occur. Forecasting such changes is extremely difficult but climate change impacts analyses 
must take into account, to the extent possible, changes to societies and how they will 
adapt.  
 
Nevertheless, there is a growing understanding of how to assess climate vulnerabilities for 
humans and ecosystems, how to frame the associated risks, and how to aggregate likely 
damage across regions and sectors. Many uncertainties remain; but our sense of what is 
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known and what is not known is growing, as is our confidence in presenting this in an 
integrated form to policymakers.   
 
The notion of resilience is an important concept. Societies that are more resilient to 
exogenous change in general will be better able to adapt to climate induced stresses. 
Climate change would put many more people at risk of malaria, for example. But this 
number was small in relation to the total number at risk. In that case, climate change is 
simply an additional reason to intensify public health measures to deal with or eliminate 
malaria. 
Session 1c Key vulnerabilities for Ecosystems and Biodiversity 
In this session the impacts of climate change on the carbon cycle and ecosystems were 
considered. Cox presented an analysis of the modelled transition from carbon sink to 
carbon source in the terrestrial biosphere.  He noted that such feedbacks have been an 
important consideration in developing the newest generations of GCMs which include the 
key processes of photosynthesis, respiration and vegetation dynamics and their responses 
to changes in CO2 and climate. His work noted that the high range of uncertainty in the 
relevant parameters, but concluded that there was a significant probability of shift from 
carbon sink to source in the terrestrial environment before the year 2100 under business-
as-usual emissions scenarios. 
 
Lewis discussed the role of tropical forests in the global carbon cycle.  He showed partly on 
the basis of permanent plot studies, how remaining forest is currently an important sink, 
while  ongoing deforestation is still an important source. However, remaining forest could 
become a major source of CO2 under business as usual scenarios, leading to rapid 
atmospheric CO2 concentration increases, this century.   He also noted that observed 
biodiversity changes, not included in the GCMs, could exacerbate such a trend. 
 
Leemans noted that the large increases in the number of studies published in the literature 
provides evidence of ecosystems changes; 21 papers were available to the IPCC TAR and 
now there are over a thousand. He emphasised that studies focusing on species specific 
responses depict more impacts than traditional impact assessments focusing on long-
range shifts of biomes. His survey showed very widespread and immediate phenological, 
species range shifts and whole food- web responses, including insects, birds, pathogens, 
lichens and trees, as a result of climate change.  He also noted that ecosystems may 
respond more strongly to changes in extreme weather events  than average climate and 
proposed that the rate be limited to 0.5 C per century instead of the commonly suggested 2 
C above pre-industrial levels. 
 
Lanchberry argued that, on the basis of ecological effects and the observed inability of 
some natural ecosystems to adapt, atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases can 
be considered to be already too high.  He pointed out alterations to species ranges, 
ecosystem loss and the unpredictability of subsequent impacts arising from changes in one 
key species.  He highlighted work in the North Sea on seabird populations, and noted that 
climate impacts on plankton abundance may have resulted in a substantial reduction in 
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sand eel numbers – a key feed species for many seabirds. This shortage has been 
independently indicated by Danish sand eel fisheries where 2003/4 catches were half the 
typical catch. 
 
Summarising these four presentations, Prentice noted a common theme which applied 
equally to studies focused on biodiversity the carbon cycle, namely, that observations of 
various kinds – including range shifts, phenology, atmospheric measurements and whole 
eco-system measurements – generally confirm current understanding of the first-order 
environmental controls on ecological processes as encapsulated in current models. 
However he observed that the interaction of these processes with land-use is less well 
understood, although land-use change is now a major driver of ecosystem changes in most 
parts of the world. Finally although some presentations had suggested specific climatic 
thresholds related to ecosystem effects, he noted that many such effects did not lend 
themselves easily to the definition of thresholds and might be better treated through a 
quantitative analysis based on multiple metrics. 
Session 1d - Socio-economic effects – key vulnerabilities for water 
resources, ecosystems, agriculture, coastal settlements and health. 
In this session presentations focused on the science behind determination of key 
magnitudes, rates and aspects of timing related to the estimated effects of climate change.   
 
Patwardhan suggested that key vulnerabilities, as measured in terms of socio-economic 
outcomes could provide useful information for countries to arrive at a well-informed 
judgment about what might be considered as dangerous levels or rates of climate change. 
He noted that climate change may be either a triggering effect on events which may have 
been pre-conditioned by other forces, or be an underlying cause in itself.   But even in its 
causative role climate change most frequently occurs as one of a set of multiple stresses.  
It is therefore necessary to consider a quite complex set of interactions between climate 
and non-climate factors affecting future human and biophysical systems. As a result, it may 
be difficult to draw a direct relation between outcomes that matter, and rates and levels of 
climate change. 
 
An illustration of this was given by Arnell in relation to effects on water supply. He noted 
that three key variables need analysis regarding their future trend: demand (dependant on 
population and its income level), vulnerability (dependant on income level and 
governance), and resource supply (in part dependant on climate change).  Even without 
climate change, water stress is expected to increase, especially in C. Asia, N. Africa and 
the drier parts of China.  Projected changes in climate are likely to alter the magnitude of 
stress and the timing of water stress.  Arnell explored the effect of different development 
pathways (as reflected in SRES projections of population and GDP) on possible future 
impacts of climate change.  Increases in water stress are likely to be higher under an A2 
than a B2 scenario primarily because of  higher vulnerability  under A2, not because of 
difference in climate forcing. 
 
     14 
Hare illustrated results from an  expert review of extensive literature across several 
systems and sectors.  He used a four-fold risk scale (from not significant to severe, 
according the proportion of damage expected).  He concluded that the point of  large 
damage (20-50 per cent) varies considerably from one exposure unit to another.  In most 
ecosystems it appears to be below 2 C above pre-industrial; but in some systems it may 
not occur even above 3 C.  In general he concluded (and this is confirmed in other studies) 
that up to 1 C increase in mean global temperature is likely to be associated with damages 
in developing countries and with some benefits in developed countries, but beyond this 
point net damage is likely to increase in all areas. 
 
Much of the analysis of potential impacts has been derived from modelling studies using 
input data from GCMs and statistical downscaling. These have been limited by the used of 
mean (for example, monthly) changes in values, and assumptions of a stationary climate. 
New work with process-based crop models, specifically designed to be coupled to GCMs, 
enable analysis of changes in CO2, climate and extremes (for example, high temperature 
events that can reduce yields, such as the stress on wheat when temperature exceeds 31 
C). They also include land-surface feedbacks to be considered. Challinor showed how his 
processed-based crop model coupled to the Hadley climate model can be used to explore 
the effects of changes including extremes on crop productivity. 
 
The importance of adaptive responses in affecting key vulnerabilities was stressed by 
Nicholls, using the example of coastal flooding due to sea level rise.  Considerable  
differences in the estimated future numbers at risk derive from assuming either: constant 
protection of coasts, or evolving protection or enhanced protection.  And, assuming 
enhanced protection in a B2 world, additional risk levels due to climate change are almost 
wholly avoided.  This confirms the conclusions reported by Parry and Arnell (see above) 
that different levels of vulnerability and wealth in various development pathways greatly 
affect the ability to delay or avoid ‘dangerous’ effects; and that choice of development 
pathway can be an effective response to climate change (e.g. SRES B2 avoids most 
dangerous effects).  This is especially relevant, since Nicholls pointed out that stabilisation 
cannot avoid all additional risk from future flooding due to the ‘commitment’ to sea-level 
rise in the ocean system. 
 
In the health sector, Kovats et al. stressed the role of climate variability, and the possible 
effects on this of climate change.  Much of the incidence of climate-related disease 
outbreak is due to particular weather events, sometimes in combination and also in relation 
to conditioning non-climate factors.  In some cases the relationship appears quite clear 
(e.g. diarrhoea incidence in Peru increases by about 8% per degree C).  In other cases it 
will require analysis from new coupled biophysical-climate models of the kind described by 
Challinor et al. 
 
In discussion it was emphasised that the ability of society to adapt is central to a 
consideration of future ‘dangerous’ effects.  Some current impact assessments do not give 
sufficient attention to this. 
 
Some conclusions from this session can be summarised as follows. 
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• Analysis of adaptive capacity is central to any determination of potential future 
critical or “dangerous” effects from climate change.  In some sectors and systems 
this capacity may be sufficient to delay or avoid much potential damage; in others it 
is quite limited. 
• The capacity to adapt is closely related to aspects of future society such as 
technological ability, level of income and type of governance. For example, impacts 
under SRES B2 development pathways appear to be much less than under A2. 
• Vulnerability (or exposure levels) may also vary considerably  between, for example, 
the A2 and B2 worlds and this evidently greatly affects the nature of possible future 
impacts, whether ‘dangerous’  effects occur, and at what time. 
• It follows from the above that a) adaptation and b) choice of development pathway 
are key potential strategies in avoiding ‘dangerous’ climate change. 
• Mitigation cannot avoid considerable impacts in the near and medium term, and 
other strategies such as adaptation will be necessary as a consequence, as part  of 
a mixed  adaptation-mitigation response to climate change. 
• Finally, new research tools such as coupled impacts-climate models offer the 
opportunity of analysing the effects of occurrence of ‘dangerous’ weather events 
rather than simply ‘dangerous’ climate change. 
Session 1e - Regional perspectives: Polar regions, Mid-latitudes, 
Tropics and Sub-tropics 
Folkestad discussed the impacts of temperature rise in the Arctic.  He pointed out that the 
Arctic has been warming at a rate of about 0.5 C per decade (although others commented 
that Arctic temperatures were as warm in the 1940s as they are today).  Using a range of 
GCMs they showed that the timeframe within which the global temperature might rise to 2 
C above pre-industrial level was between 2026 and 2060. Such a rise could be equivalent 
to 3.2 to 6.6 C increase in the Arctic temperature. Their paper also showed that for each 1 
C warming, perennial ice in the Arctic Ocean decreases by about 1.5 million km2. The work 
suggested that such changes will have major impacts on ice living animals, but also 
important social and economic consequences for indigenous people.  
 
Steffen and co-authors examined southern hemisphere perceptions of dangerous climate 
change, which are clearly necessary to complete our global picture.  He showed that the 
distribution of rainfall over Australia has changed markedly over the past 50 years, with 
both large increases and decreases. Rainfall in SW Australia underwent a 15% decrease in 
the mid-70s, while at this time crop yields were increased due to changes in practices.  
However, at the same time stream flow decreased by 50%; as a consequence Perth is 
already water constrained. This case study showed how the same change in climate can 
have dramatically different consequences for different sectors. Changing SSTs and 
decreasing ocean pH have a marked effect on coral bleaching events; if these become too 
frequent coral reefs will be unable to recover.  There is a lack of knowledge linking the 
impact of longer-term climate change with the behaviour of major climate features  such as 
ENSO and ocean circulation. Steffen stated that for Australia there was a significant risk of 
further decreases in rainfall, leading to more severe and more prolonged droughts. They 
emphasised that the rate of change might be more important than the magnitude of the 
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change and that changes in water availability will be as important as the changes in 
temperature per se. 
 
Harasawa showed how climatic changes had brought about an increase in extreme events 
in Asia in recent years. For example there were 10 typhoons in Japan during 2004. Large 
proportions of the Japanese coastal population are at risk with a 1 m rise in sea level. 
Other observed impacts included changes in the beech forests, water stresses and human 
health. There are indications that in India there will be increased water stress due to 
climate change that will affect crops such as rice and wheat. The paper called for more 
research to better understand the geographical scope and magnitude of expected impacts, 
and to try and identify critical thresholds in different sectors.  
 
Nyong highlighted the vulnerability of Africa to climate change; 70% of the least-developed 
countries are in Africa.  This high vulnerability is a result not just of climatic factors, but of 
other stresses such as drought, disease and conflict.  These impacts and vulnerabilities will 
be felt strongly in the water resources, agriculture, fisheries and health sectors.  Under 
climate change scenarios, the work showed that the majority of crops will decrease in yield, 
that the area suitable for malaria in southern Africa will double and coral reefs will be lost 
due to bleaching, bringing associated impacts on the tourism industry.  The paper included 
a call for more capacity building on adaptation in Africa, including the use of appropriate 
technologies, integration of indigenous knowledge and improved access to available 
funding. 
 
Vogel and Nyong highlighted the linkages between climate change and development in 
Africa. They noted the key links between climate change and food security, water 
resources and other health factors. They emphasised that climate change will affect the 
achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. The paper called for more research at 
the climate/development nexus, in particular on the need to balance trade-offs between 
adaptation options. 
 
Hayhoe presented an impact assessment for California based on two different climate 
change scenarios, but noted the difficulty in estimating future amounts of precipitation. 
California is a large climate-sensitive region with a wide variety of ecosystems. Primary 
findings showed that temperature could rise up to 4 C locally under a low emissions 
scenario and up to 8 C under a higher emissions scenario, and impacts on the region 
varied significantly between scenarios. As such, this approach could be applied to other 
regions  around the world as a starting point from which to assess how risk of  "dangerous" 
impacts scales with emissions. Hayhoe highlighted the importance of region-specific 
climate impact assessments covering a range of future scenarios to inform decision 
makers of potential "dangerous"  impacts and the outcome of alternative GHG emission 
and stabilisation choices. 
 
In discussing the session, Huq indicated the need for more regional scale models, which 
requires the ability to downscale to the local/national level. In particular, he highlighted the 
need for local models of politically relevant regions such as Small Island Developing States 
(SIDS) and Least Developed Countries (LDCs). These are the most vulnerable according 
to UNFCCC (Article 4.8) and therefore very relevant for specific efforts at targeted regional 
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impacts assessments. However there is a requirement for further research in each of the 
important regions. It will also be necessary to compare the results from regional studies 
with the global analyses to check consistency. 
Working paper on the impacts literature 
Warren introduced a working paper, commissioned by Defra, consisting of a number of 
tables of impacts. These presented different categories of impacts as a function of global 
temperature and sea level rise. She explained the rationale behind this work and the need 
to present possible impacts of climate change in an accessible way for policy makers. She 
also requested participants to provide feedbacks, including some positive, to enable her to 
improve the draft tables.    
 
Session 2 – Emission pathways and climate sensitivity 
 
This session considered the probabilities of exceeding different concentrations on 
temperatures given alternative pathways.   
 
Mastrandrea and Meinshausen proposed a probabilistic approach to climate sensitivity as 
an appropriate method to inform policy makers of the risks of exceeding levels of 
Dangerous Anthropogenic Interference (DAI) for various stabilisation levels. Examples of 
such DAIs used are, for example,. EU 2 C stabilisation target and a  DAI index based on an 
equal weighting of  the IPCC TAR reasons of concern (Mastrandrea). Meinshausen used a 
set of different published PDFs for indicating the risk of exceeding temperature targets for 
various stabilisation levels.  
 
The constructed probability density functions indicate that the range of climate sensitivity 
(CS) values is much wider than suggested by the IPCC, in particular the probability of high 
values. While the most likely level of temperature change for double CO2 is 2-4 C above 
pre-industrial more extreme change cannot be ruled out. Stainforth’s exploration of 
uncertainty inherent in GCM modelling using distributed computational power showed that 
the response to even a relatively low stabilisation level (doubled CO2) could be as much as 
11 C above pre-industrial level.  
 
Stainforth and Allen highlighted that there are problems with constraining climate sensitivity 
on the basis of observational data and that the various PDFs are determined by subjective 
expert judgements in their construction.  Analyses of transient responses seem to indicate 
that the uncertainty in the CS is less important on the shorter timeframe of stabilisation 
than equilibrium responses. Allen suggested an alternative approach would be to consider 
the more well-constrained relationship between cumulative emissions and maximum 
temperature change.  
 
The pathways associated with meeting climate targets were explored by several of the 
speakers. 
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Den Elzen noted the importance of considering the non-CO2 gases and aerosols when 
analysing pathways. Tol showed that rapid reductions of global greenhouse gas emissions 
will lead to an initial increase in temperature due to aerosol reductions, although there was 
no discussion of the fact that reduced aerosol emissions were likely with or without reduced 
CO2 emissions. Jones showed that carbon cycle feedbacks currently underestimated will 
have significant impacts on future pathways by requiring 20-30% greater emissions cuts to 
meet 550 ppmv CO2 stabilisation goals, and changes in optimal trajectories. Climate-
carbon cycle feedbacks are also critical in determining the feasibility of “overshoot” 
scenarios which may rely on natural carbon sinks to reduce CO2 levels to the stabilisation 
target. 
 
Meinshausen and Den Elzen considered the likelihood of overshooting the EU target of 2 C 
above pre-industrial level and indicated that there was a relatively high risk of exceeding 
the target when stabilising at 550 ppm CO2 equivalent, and even some risk at 400 ppm 
and referred to studies that show that there is already a risk that the target will be 
exceeded even on current levels. The dependence of such outcomes on the PDFs used 
was noted.   Meinshausen also showed that the risk of overshoot a temperature target can 
be reduced by letting concentrations peak (and then decrease) before they are stabilised.  
 
They further considered the cuts needed to meet the EU target and indicated that 
emissions would need to peak around 2015, with subsequent decreases by 2050 
dependent on the eventual stabilisation level (-10% for stabilising at 550 ppmv CO2, e.g. 
and about 15% more for each 50 ppmv lower stabilisation target). In the case of low 
stabilisation targets (400–500 ppmv CO2 equivalent), concentrations temporarily exceed 
the target levels before they return to their ultimate stabilisation targets by 2150. This 
overshoot is needed due to the short timeframes for adjustment and the present 
concentrations. 
 
They, and others, highlighted the consequences of delaying action on climate change. 
Meinshausen showed that delays are possible but result in the need to increase reduction 
rates by approximately 1% for each five year delay. Kallbekken showed that a 20-year 
delay of action could result in required rates of emission reduction of 3-7 times greater than 
that required for a more immediate response to meet the same temperature target. Den 
Elzen also indicated the regional implications of stabilisation pathways, because that is 
important when considering cost and feasibility aspects.  
 
Tol stated that no objective definition of dangerous interference is possible. Using a cost-
benefit framework he suggested that only moderate mitigation levels are justifiable. He also 
pointed at the possible risk that too rapid mitigation, reducing economic growth, could 
increase vulnerability and climate change impacts in developing countries.  
 
The discussion on climate sensitivity focused on the problems in defining PDFs and 
possible alternatives. A discussion on pathways included the importance of considering the 
rates of temperature change. In the discussion it was acknowledged that the costs and 
economic effects of stabilisation pathways, and the additional risks related to overshooting 
scenarios need to be considered. 
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Session 3 - Technology options for achieving stabilisation of 
greenhouse gases at different stabilisation concentrations in the 
atmosphere, taking into account costs and uncertainties 
 
Metz noted that low-level stabilisation would not require totally new technologies such as 
nuclear fusion and that sustainable development strategies and corresponding behavioural 
attitudes would make low-level stabilisation easier. He pointed out that there are no magic 
bullets; a portfolio of options is needed and excluding any options will increase costs. Multi-
gas strategies, emission trading, optimal timing and strong technology development, 
diffusion and trading are all required to keep costs of low-level stabilisation relatively low.  
A big problem for low-level stabilisation is overcoming the many political, social and 
behavioural barriers to implementing mitigation options. Co-benefits (development, 
security, environment) are important for costs and acceptability.  
 
Socolow introduced the concept of the stabilisation wedge as a useful unit for discussing 
climate stabilisation. Each wedge is equivalent to 1 Gt C/yr of emissions savings in 2054, 
achieved by a single strategy that will not occur without deliberate attention to global 
carbon. He suggested that seven wedges would establish a path to stabilisation at a 
concentration less than double the pre-industrial concentration.  This new framework also 
considers wedges of energy efficiency, nuclear energy and carbon capture and storage.  
The wedges concept permits discussion of cost, pace, risk and trade-offs associated with 
climate change.  The framework could contribute new elements to global carbon policy, 
promoting internationally coordinated commercialisation of low-carbon technology.  
 
Akimoto and Tomoda evaluated the costs and technological options by region for various 
CO2 emissions reduction targets using their world energy systems model, which covers 77 
regions over a 100-year time-span. Three case studies were covered by the evaluation: no 
climate policy; stabilisation at 550 ppmv CO2; and stabilisation at 450 ppmv CO2. They 
considered that the most cost effective stabilisation option would be made up of a mix of 
technological options, that the marginal cost of CO2 reduction in 2100 is about 120 and 290 
US$/tC for 550 and 450 ppmv respectively, and that carbon capture and storage is 
important, especially for developed countries, to reduce the costs in both stabilisation 
cases. 
 
Edmonds addressed the energy technology implications of limiting climate change in the 
year 2100 to 2 C relative to pre-industrial. 
 
An Integrated Assessment Model (MiniCam and MAGICC) was used to simulate the future 
up to 2095, with a full physical model plus demography, land resource constraints and 
energy technology.  Cost minimisation with full trading was assumed.  The reference used 
was the IPCC SRES B-2 scenario. 
 
Some interesting conclusions were obtained. The portfolio of  technological options to meet 
a 2 C above pre-industrial level limit included  a multigas approach and a substantial share 
of CO2 capture and storage. Costs of this strategy are lower than estimated for similar 
constraints in the past. Global emissions peak before 2020 and decline to about 3 GtC/year 
by the end of the century. 
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Barker and Warren addressed the question of the costs of atmospheric stabilisation of 
CO2, by coupling the E3MG energy-environment-economy model to a simple climate 
model (MAGICC).  The approach is based on new concepts in the modelling of induced 
technological change (ITC) and thus provides new insights into the costs of stabilisation. A 
baseline scenario is compared with three others in which carbon taxes with revenue 
recycling are applied to achieve stabilisation of carbon dioxide concentrations at three 
different levels by 2100. The study showed that the projected cost of mitigation could be 
more than halved if technological learning is taken into account. 
 
Zhou described current trends of world development. Technology innovation in developed 
countries lead  technology change across the world. Globalisation and market forces drive 
the developing countries to follow the same pattern practiced by the developed countries. 
Up to now, higher per capita GDP correlated with higher carbon emission, although higher 
GDP also leads to lower carbon intensity. He noted that if per capita emissions can not be 
decreased significantly in the developed world, there is no way to achieve any of the 
stabilisation targets. Moreover, energy efficiency improvements under the present market 
system are not enough to offset increases in demand caused by economic growth, 
although China has shown significantly higher efficiency improvement rates in the recent 
past. Thus we need, it was suggested, to create a new low-emission model of global 
development with the developed countries taking the lead. Efficiency improvements and 
alternatives of supplies such as nuclear and renewables are of priority for developing 
country to contribute their share to the effort of stabilisation. 
 
Read reviewed the efficacy of bio-energy with carbon storage (BECS) as a technology for 
reducing emissions. He noted that this technology  has negative emissions  and could be 
important for rapid deployment in case of  a  threat of abrupt climate change. He suggested 
that  the first stage of such a scheme  (having low or possibly negative costs, depending on 
oil prices, and yielding numerous ancillary benefits) should be embarked on without delay.  
This is because it has long lead times and needs to be well advanced in preparation for the 
costly second stage, which would be undertaken urgently in the event that abrupt climate 
change becomes imminent. If the second stage, linking CCS technology to bioenergy, 
needs to be implemented, then the pre-industrial level of 280 ppm is attainable by around 
2060, with lower levels later on if needed to compensate for non-CO2 greenhouse gases. 
 
Gibbins et al reviewed the scope for future carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies 
for achieving CO2 emissions reductions from electricity generation in the United Kingdom. 
Among the conclusions, the research team suggest that large (approx. 45%) reductions in 
CO2 emissions from UK electricity generation could be achieved by as early as 2020 by 
including CCS in the mitigation strategy. The team also conclude that CCS technologies 
have considerable potential for future emissions reductions globally, and that making new 
power plants at least “capture ready”, if not actually built to capture CO2 from the outset, is 
particularly important in economies where large numbers of new power plants are being 
built. 
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Session 4: Research requirements 
 
The chairman Schellnhuber opened the session with a strategic comment on the research 
needs concerning the two main issues of the conference. Regarding the scientific 
underpinning of political perceptions of  “dangerous climate change”, he suggested to focus 
on a shortlist of  critical Earth System elements (e.g., Greenland ice sheet, methane 
clathrates). This might require to focus resources over the next 5-10 years through a fast-
track initiative or even a Manhattan Project-type activity. The identification of just one or 
two major critical thresholds might already be sufficient to define robust temperature 
targets. 
 
By way of contrast,  the chairman  recommended to pursue a broad research portfolio 
approach regarding climate-change management through mitigation and adaptation 
measures. Rather than relying on the discovery of a “magic bullet”, one should generate a 
diversity of technological, institutional and socioeconomic options for overcoming the 
multiple real-world barriers to climate protection.  
 
Patwardan sketched  three research areas he felt were particularly in need of more work. 
Firstly he explained that we have made progress in understanding adaptation and now we 
need to be able to quantify it. He indicated that we need impact models that can both 
quantify the impacts and also design the response. Secondly, he suggested that a good 
strategy would be action research, learning as we develop and validate conceptual models. 
Finally, he noted the need for capacity building in developing countries with sustainable 
long term investment. This would include an open source approach to modelling and tools. 
 
Schneider concluded that the scientific community should be a policy aware, but not a 
policy prescriptive community. He suggested a risk management framework to explore the 
wide range of approaches and asses probabilities. He suggested that we should use PDFs 
where possible, as cost benefit analyses result in too specific arbitrary results. Schneider 
concluded that future research should use coupled models to find emerging behaviours, 
and that scientists should talk across communities, both scientific and policy. 
 
Metz suggested that we need to understand our implementation process and identify why 
things are so difficult. One important solution is to encourage the development of climate 
change science from within developing countries. We also need to understand more about 
how technology development and diffusion occur. 
 
Hare said that current models are inadequate to explain some of the rapid changes in ice 
sheets observed global and indicated the need for more accurate models. We also need 
more research into the response of circum polar deep water to climate change. He 
reiterated the need for coupled climate systems to asses the risk of events such as the 
release of methane hydrates from the ocean. 
 
Stone reiterated the need for systematic observations of the climate. While, Read 
advocated  learning-by-doing in the development of a global bio-energy industry, with world 
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trade in liquid biofuels and which in turn would benefit the development of global bio-
energy through applied research. 
